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Religious Liberty in Australia:

some suggestions and proposals for reframing traditional categorisations
Iain T. Benson

INTRODUCTION

T
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he Religious Freedom Review (Ruddock Review),
established by the Government of Australia,
provided an opportunity to make some suggestions
and proposals for ways to understand religious liberty
in this country. The purpose of the author’s Submission
to the Review, and of this article, is to show more
accurately what is at stake and how certain traditional
categorisations stand in the way of more useful and fair
ways of viewing religion and the public sphere. Some
of the suggestions relate to human rights legislation,
where many questions of religious liberty are or should
be addressed, but other aspects go well beyond that to
the question of how we think of religion in relation to
the contemporary state itself. These considerations are
framed within an evaluation of how some challenges to
religious liberty have emerged and been dealt with in
other countries, particularly Canada and South Africa.
This article is focused on important principles. It
discusses religious liberty, human rights and human
communities, as well as the language often employed
to describe the relationship between them. For it is
in understanding the role and nature of communities
in relation to some aspects of scholarly and practical
concern regarding religious liberty, human rights
and religious communities themselves, as these are
developing in practice, that we can understand the role
and nature of religious liberty today: context is key to
understanding what should be avoided or adopted.
This article raises concerns about the context of
religious liberty and human rights today, particularly
where bi-furcative or dualistic uses are employed in
relation to the interpretation of the de-contextualised
terminology usually used in a human rights context terms such as ‘equality’ and ‘non-discrimination’. These
terms are bi-furcative or dualistic when they are used
expressly or implicitly to bracket religious belief outside
shared public dimensions. Such uses (believer/unbeliever,
‘communities of faith’, ‘people of faith’ etc.) fail to
describe accurately the nature of the realm of competing
belief systems that is the reality of the contemporary
public sphere. Simply put, this is because everyone has
‘faith’ and ‘belief’, often without knowing that they do or
without acknowledging their commitments to whatever
they believe in (and it is not possible to believe nothing):
not all ‘beliefs’ or ‘faith’ are religious, meaning that not
all are oriented to a Divinity. Atheists and agnostics are,
therefore, also believers of a certain kind and, if we wish
a fair sharing of the public sphere, their commitments
should have no dominant position there.
Worse, ideas that the public sphere is ‘secular’ or ‘neutral’, when this is neither true nor possible, further obfuscate descriptions of the reality that are so important for understanding what is actually at issue when religious liberty
is being discussed or analysed in relation to the state.
This article does not develop the arguments for or
against particular legislative language, except in relation

to the important terms ‘discrimination’ (as discussed in the
submission of ‘Freedom for Faith’1) and ‘hatred’, when what
is really at issue is mere disagreement. This article focuses
on principles that should apply whatever frameworks
are adopted in future. The author has been privileged to
have read the submissions of Freedom for Faith and of the
Catholic Bishops and agrees with the recommendations in
both of these submissions, so does not repeat them here.
As will be seen, this article raises serious concerns
about how religious liberty and human rights are
being developed in other countries and, in particular,
how diversity is being threatened by those who have
agendas to push and who see human rights legislation or
particular de-contextualised approaches to ‘equality’ or
‘discrimination’ as a ready means of doing so. This is the
result of the abstraction of principles from communities.
This article pushes back on such abstraction and calls into
question the legitimacy of avoiding the lived context of
communities. In several instances this article identifies
direct challenges to human rights that are themselves
posed in the name of human rights.
There is much to be said for protecting the role of
legislative bodies rather than transferring policymaking
to judicial or quasi-judicial bodies such as human rights
tribunals. Often such transfers are justified under the
guise of human rights ‘discrimination’ protection or
‘advancing equality’, where both concepts are detached
from the context that is essential to a diverse and plural
society. This article outlines some of these concerns,
drawing particularly on the experiences around human
rights discourse and policy in Canada and South Africa.
No comment is made on the outworking of human rights
in Australia; but it is assumed, with good reason, that the
tendencies identified elsewhere, particularly in regard to
lack of respect for individual and community difference,
will be evident as well in Australia - though it will be
for those more expert in this jurisdiction to make that
assessment alongside what is seen in other countries.
It may be asserted that ‘things are fine’ in both Canada
and South Africa, but having acted as an academic and
legal advisor to a wide variety of groups in both countries,
this author can confirm that things are anything but fine.
There is considerable concern in these countries that
the vague language of ‘human rights’, as with the vague
language of ‘equality’, is being used as a blank slate upon
which those with transformational aims can attempt
to force their versions of culture on society in general,
using the power of law to do so through human rights
cases.2 For this reason, great care must be taken in any
approach to ‘human rights’ today. This article raises some
of these foundational concerns for the consideration of
the Review and, perhaps, beyond it. Professor Parkinson,
in his Freedom for Faith submission, suggests that debates
around the nature of marriage, and the fall-out from what
the redefinitions lead to, are ‘resolved’; with respect, I
suggest otherwise.3 Litigation in Canada and the United
States, to name but two countries, shows that, following
re-definition, a host of challenges, some of them highly
aggressive, can be anticipated. It is to be hoped that the

Review, by delineating some of the potential pitfalls where
religious liberty is not adequately protected, will apply
lessons from other countries so as to avoid anticipated
similar challenges in Australia in the years ahead.
The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
denying accreditation to a Law School on the basis
of its Evangelical Protestant ‘Community Covenant’
looks to have wide-spread and perhaps international
implications. That Covenant at Trinity Western University,
a private university in British Columbia, included a
limitation of marriage to only married heterosexuals,
and excluded same-sex relationships as well as nonmarried heterosexual ones. Since the community view
was that the only valid marriage should be between
one man and one woman - a standard view for most
traditional religions - the extension of ‘public interest’
to rule against accreditation of the private law school
shows how notions of ‘public’ and ‘diversity’ must be
carefully understood in relation to access to public goods.
Such matters as tax exempt status, charitable status and
other types of licencing and accreditation are now at
risk for religious groups and projects if they do not toe
the Supreme Court of Canada’s majority reasoning. The
decision is attracting a firestorm of controversy.4
One point referred to bears repeating here. Despite
express legislative statements indicating that various viewpoints on the nature of marriage were part of the Canadian
scene, and clear indications in the legislation that religious
officials would not be subjected to pressures to conform to
the broader definition, Canada has experienced an unrelenting wave of legal and social challenges to those who
continue to affirm ‘traditional marriage’. This is not a good
outcome. If Australia is to head off some of the more aggressive and unjust campaigns against advocates of traditional
marriage, the Review should address expressly the need for
unambiguous protections in the areas that have been hot
spots for litigation in other countries (charitable status, accreditation, curriculum, parental rights, marriage counselling,
marriage commissioners, definitions of ‘hate speech’ etc.).

RECOMMENDATIONS IN BRIEF
1. Getting the language of ‘faith’, ‘belief’ and the
nature of the public sphere correct
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2. Freedom from and freedom for religion
Ensure that the formula ‘freedom from religion’ is not
employed when what is usually meant is ‘freedom from
religious coercion’. A ‘strict separationist’ mindset can
creep in alongside flawed suggestions that citizens have a
‘right’ (which they do not) to be freed from any incidents
of the public manifestation of religious belief. To take
one example, the presence of religious ceremonies held
in public ought not to trigger claims that citizens should
be free from seeing or hearing any public manifestation.
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
protects the right ‘…alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance’. The limits to
such manifestations are significant and weighty: ‘subject
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely
for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect
for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the
just requirements of morality, public order and the general
welfare in a democratic society’.6
3. Focus on unjust discrimination, not just
‘discrimination’
Create the category of ‘unjust discrimination’, not simply
‘discrimination’, so as to distinguish between just and
unjust discriminations in any legislation.
4. Recognise a general ‘Presumption in Favour of
Diversity’
Any legal developments should include a presumption in
favour of diversity.7
5. Where a religious ethos is shared, recognise not only
the ‘core religious functions’
Respect the organic approach to religious exemptions
so that all employees in a given religious organisation
have their beliefs respected, not just those in ‘leadership’
roles. Do not make any employment-related exemptions
depend on the functions of the job in an organisation that
has a shared ethos. An ‘organic approach’ recognises that,
for some sorts of religious projects, everyone is involved
in the religious mission irrespective of their actual jobfunctions. Where, for example, a janitor or gardener is
involved in prayers, leading sacred text studies or playing
religious music, it would be wrong to say that the nature
of their ‘job duties’ qua gardener, janitor etc. are not
part of the shared religious ethos or organic mission of
the project. The error of ‘core function’ analysis is that it
simply looks at the leadership team of a religious project
as the only positions sheltered by religious exemptions,
thereby ignoring or showing scant regard for the
associational dimension of religious belief and projects.
6. Accommodate the exercise of conscience
Ensure that the duty of the accommodation of conscience
is spelled out as both a public and private necessity. In
relation to medical (and pharmaceutical) services, the
right to conscientious objection and non-referral should
be recognised explicitly and protected.
7. Limit ‘hate speech’ to the incitement of violence, not
merely ‘hurt feelings’
Limit offensive speech restrictions to ‘incitement to
commit violence or physical harm’.
8. Establish a Religious Liberty Commission and
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Ensure that the language used to describe the nature
of the state accurately reflects its philosophical (and
theological) realities and is, as much as possible,
descriptive of the nature of citizens as ‘believers’,
the state as ‘inclusive’ of all citizens (religious and
non-religious) and all communities as, in some sense,
‘communities of faith’. These terms may be employed
in ways that suggest that ‘faith’ and ‘belief’ are the
properties of religious individuals and their communities
only. This is an error that fails to deal adequately with
the realities. Everyone is a ‘believer’: the question is
not whether one is, but rather what one believes in. To
place, therefore, religious beliefs at any sort of ‘public
disadvantage’ is to act secularistically, furthering the
strategy of exclusion set out by the man who coined the
term ‘secularism’ - George Jacob Holyoake.5 The public
sphere, rightly understood, is the realm of competing
belief systems - some religious, some not, but all are
belief-based and everyone acts on the basis of faith,
since not all faith is religious faith. Faith and belief are

essential for everyone, whether they realise it or not.
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Religious Liberty Council to encourage the
involvement of civil society
Consider establishing a Religious Liberty Commission,
consisting, in part, of representatives put forward by the
major religions themselves. The Head of this Commission
shall be elected from among the Members for a rotating
period of no longer than two terms (of three years each).
In addition, consider establishing a Religious Council as
an adjunct to the Commission, made up of appointees
from the religions, other concerned citizens and
representative members of the Commission itself.8
9. Ensure that the public sphere is fully accessible
to religious and non-religious citizens (and their
projects) alike
Make clear that the ‘public sphere’ is one fully accessible
to all citizens, religious and non-religious. The privatising
of religion was and is one of the goals of secularism
which, properly understood, is an anti-religious ideology.
10. Co-operation not ‘Separation’ of ‘Church and State’
Australia, in common with Canada and South Africa,
enjoys the ‘co-operation’ of religion and the state, not its
separation. In so far as there is jurisdictional separation,
this does not undermine the essential co-operation (but
not merger) of ‘church and state’, and this relationship
should be expressed as a co-operation not separation.

A. BACKGROUND: IMPORTANCE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
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The importance of understanding the proper scope of
human rights: it should not be ‘The New Secular Religion
of Our Time’
Writing as an academic new to Australia, but one
experienced with law as a theorist and practitioner in
Canada, South Africa and Europe, this author believes it
is important to see the development and extension of
human rights as part of a Western movement to protect
human rights but one that, paradoxically, often threatens
the very diversity it purports to respect.
Who can object to ‘protecting human rights’? In this day
and age it has become a mantra, but one must be careful
that what is established contains genuine safeguards for
diversity; many of those who argue for the extension of
human rights have, as an implied goal, forced changes to
the beliefs of others with which they disagree. Compelling
others to agree by force of law with moral propositions or
actions that ought to be open for dissent in a free society
is the very definition of an authoritarian state. History
shows all too clearly that it is in the protection of and
respect for difference on those subjects that matter most
to many of us that an ‘open society’ remains free. Shutting
down dissent and failing to grant accommodation is the
preferred tactic of those who wish to use law, rather than
popular debate and changeable legislative frameworks, to
obtain cultural dominance.
This article argues that for many people religious liberty and human rights are viewed as threatening; this need
not be the case. If the goal is to create a culture in which
religious liberty and human rights are respected, then the
culture produced must be one that recognises respect. In
particular, the structure of any human rights instruments
must be framed in part in relation to the experiences in
other countries and must do what it can to put into place

protections to show respect for diversity, against those
who often will try to use human rights itself to attack
diversity or coerce people to change how they think.9
Legislation can be changed within the rough and ready
flexibility of democratic politics; constitutions are less flexible, and the vague application of balancing and proportionality tests transfers vast areas of social control to unelected
judicial bodies and tribunals. Over the door of every human
rights tribunal should be the phrase: ‘tread carefully here,
for the right to disagree is essential to freedom’.
Considering how and whether to adopt Bills of Rights
or Human Rights Protections can be a useful exercise,
provided that such extension maintains respect for
diversity and understands the danger of human rights
themselves becoming ideological and, in fact, coercive.
Case law from other countries, particularly Canada,
has shown just such unwarranted extensions of human
rights. In Canada it is routine for religious believers and
their communities to feel threatened by human rights
complaints, in which the goal of the complaint often
seems to be the forcing of new conceptions of morality on
communities that ought to be protected to develop and
maintain their own belief systems as free as possible from
coercion by the state (understood as law and politics).
American political theorists Stephen Macedo and
William Galston10 and English philosopher John Gray11
have all warned of the dangers of illiberal ‘convergence’,
or the tendencies towards ‘civic totalism’ that lurk within
many legal or political approaches that use the rhetoric
of ‘liberalism’ or ‘human rights’ today. These writers and
others have rightly identified the danger of attempts to
force other citizens to ‘toe the line’ in relation to matters
that should properly remain open. Abortion, euthanasia
and the nature of marriage are three contemporary issues
that show the capacity or incapacity of democratic regimes
to properly respect the morally different viewpoints of
citizens. In each case the historical record ought to give
us considerable cause for concern, as the principles of
accommodation discussed in this article are often lacking
or not present at all in relation to these issues.
William Galston, for example, has warned that:
…an account of liberal democracy built on a foundation
of political pluralism should make us very cautious
about expanding the scope of state power in ways that
mandate uniformity.12
With respect to the relationship between an
abstraction such as ‘equality’ and the lived communal
reality of diversity, South Africa’s former Constitutional
Court Justice, Albie Sachs, had this to say about diversity
in a decision dealing with the rights of gays and lesbians:
[E]quality should not be confused with uniformity; in
fact, uniformity can be the enemy of equality. Equality
means equal concern and respect across difference. It
does not presuppose the elimination or suppression
of difference. Respect for human rights requires the
affirmation of self, not the denial of self. Equality
therefore does not imply a levelling or homogenisation
of behaviour but an acknowledgment and acceptance
of difference.13
One may believe, even vehemently, that everyone
should accept his or her view of same-sex conduct, or (to
take another deeply held belief based on an equality right)

that the priesthood within Roman Catholicism should be
female as well as male, or that issues such as abortion and
euthanasia should not allow for dissent; one may argue for
that viewpoint in public and private spheres. One is not,
however, entitled to force those who disagree to have their
views and presumably organisations ‘purged’ from society,
coerced to change or forced to co-operate with the beliefs
of others by force of law. At least, so Gray and Galston
counsel in their approaches to liberalism.
Human rights ought not to be an ‘Unofficial State
Religion’ or become an ideology that seeks to force
convergence or cultural ‘Transformation’
Former Canadian Justice Minister and a noted human
rights and religious liberty expert, Irwin Cotler, once
referred, without irony or criticism, to human rights as
‘the new secular religion of our time’.14 This ought to
raise concerns for those who believe in the appropriate
jurisdictional division between ‘church and state’. Yet
another leading Canadian authority on human rights,
Michael Ignatieff, in what could be seen as a rejection
of Cotler’s un-nuanced statement, has warned of the
significant danger of viewing human rights as ‘idolatry’ or
as some kind of replacement religion.15 He writes:
Human rights is misunderstood, I shall argue, if it is
seen as a “secular religion”. It is not a creed; it is not
metaphysics. To make it so is to turn it into a species
of idolatry: humanism worshipping itself. Elevating
the moral and metaphysical claims made on behalf of
human rights may be intended to increase its universal
appeal. In fact, it has the opposite effect, raising doubts
among religious and non-Western groups who do not
happen to be in need of Western secular creeds.16
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…we are now in the twilight of the liberal consensus
as we have known it. It may survive, with important
revisions. Or it may collapse all together, and new
prophets will arise to predict what will come after
it. One thing, however, seems certain: the liberal
consensus that emerged after the enlightenment, gelled
in the nineteenth century, and reached a more or less
stable form in the twentieth century, cannot last much
longer as a basic, unquestioned assumption about the
way we live. From within and beyond its borders, the
liberal consensus is under attack. On all sides we are
hearing calls, sometimes measured and sometimes
shrill, for a revision or an outright rejection of the terms
of the liberal treaty.19
The traditions that gave us ‘civic virtues’ are no
longer understood and even within these traditions the
language of ‘virtue’ has been replaced, almost entirely,
by the vague and amorphous language of ‘values’, with
few recognising the tremendous catastrophe this poses to
our understanding of shared meaning. Professor Edward
Andrew of the University of Toronto has noted that ‘...
there has been only partial awareness [in the Western
academy] that the language of values entails that nothing
is intrinsically good and nobody is intrinsically worthy’.20
Such a diagnosis ought to concern anyone who believes
that human beings are intrinsically worthy but who is
trying to articulate this in the ‘language of values’.
Identifying the general problems of ‘convergence’
and ‘civic totalism’, referred to above, and recognising the
authoritarian dimensions of notions such as ‘deep equality’
(as discussed in Canada) give us some tools to analyse
these moves when they arise in politics, law, religious
studies and sociology, to name a few disciplines now
interested in human rights. Here, an observation by David
Novak appropriately sums up what has been discussed:
A society dedicated to the protection and enhancements
of its participatory cultures surely commands more
respect and devotion than does a society established
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There is a reason that human rights ought not to be
perceived or treated as ‘a new secular religion’: it does
not have the competence to do what religions do. For
another thing, human rights cannot be a religion as it is for
everyone and is generalised across a national- or statebased jurisdiction. As such it must be for the benefit of all
citizens, whether they are religious or not. It is in the nature,
therefore, of a common denominator, and ought not to have
either implicitly or explicitly a ‘transformational’ (religious)
mandate. It must work with civic associations (including
religions) as it finds them, not start out with an implicit or
explicit idea that it has a mandate to ‘change society’.
For reasons in part articulated by Ignatieff, human
rights can properly have no such mandate in a pluralistic
and diverse society. To make it ‘transformative’ in any way
can only result in an insufficient respect for differing contexts - contexts that, in themselves, do have a right to the
metaphysical traditions that speak of personal and group
‘transformation’ but through, typically, the languages of religious commitments and in some cases Divine revelation.
For human rights to take on this mantle would mean that
it will inevitably become not only ‘idolatrous’, as Ignatieff
understands it, but, given its legal mandate, dangerously
theocratic in practice - threatening religions as it does so
and, paradoxically, undercutting the very enlightenment
project of de-coupling the state from religions.
Human rights should not occupy expressly or by
default the roles of religions. For all the above reasons
and others, great care must be taken, therefore, to ensure
that wide latitude is given to alternative belief systems

(religious and otherwise) so as to ensure their ability to
operate without fear of hindrance or reprisal. Human rights
discourse and policy (and legislation) need to focus on
developing new approaches that assist diversity in reality,
not only in name while hosting homogenising conceptions
of culture under a guise of respecting diversity. Sadly,
such nuanced care is no longer the standard template in
Canada, where it is now routine for religious believers and
their communities to face unrelenting challenges to their
open and free operation, or even to the existence of their
projects - such as, most recently, founding a Christianbased law school.17 Australia could easily be taken down
the same road and must think carefully and differently lest
such errors be repeated here.18
This is not the place to embark on a detailed analysis
of how this happened, but something like the expansion
of law in attempts to replace, by law, concepts that were
developed within the metaphysical richness of religions
plays a large part in this shift: one need only consider
how contemporaries ground the notion of ‘respect for the
person’ or ‘dignity of the person’ when religious grounds
provided the cornerstone of human rights in the past. The
‘liberal consensus’ that many felt comfortable with has
now been widely regarded as having broken down. Thus,
Paul Horwitz has written, somewhat boldly, that:
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merely to protect and enhance property. When,
however, a civil society no longer respects that
communal priority, it inevitably attempts to replace
that sacred realm by becoming a sacred realm itself.
As such, it attempts to become the highest realm in
the lives of its citizens. In becoming what some have
called a ‘civil religion,’ civil society usurps the role
of historic traditions of faith. It becomes what it was
never intended to be, for the hallmark of a democratic
social order is the continuing limitation of its governing
range. Without such limitation, any society tends to
expand its government indefinitely. But such limitation
cannot come from within; it can only come from what
is both outside it and above it. Today that external and
transcendent limitation can be found in the freedom
of citizens in a democracy to find their primal identity
by being and remaining a part of their traditional
communities. This is what has come to be known in
democracies as religious liberty.21
To Novak’s insight that civil society as civil religion
becomes a ‘sacred realm’ itself, we need to add that law
becomes the divinity in such a metastasised vision. The
antidote to the drug of civic or legal inflation, and the
corresponding deflation of respect for associations and
difference, is a re-understanding of what is actually taking
place where law, religion and society meet. Human rights
is now at the cutting edge of attempts to remake society
by law and, for the reasons this article sets out, we should
be highly suspicious of these developments and try to
ensure that the utopian dimensions of the projects are
avoided where possible and blocked where necessary.

B. SPECIFC ANALYSIS OF RECOMMENDED PROVISIONS
1. Not all discrimination is bad: the need for specificity
in relation to the term ‘Discrimination’
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Not all discrimination is bad or should be the subject of
legal penalties. This is widely misunderstood. People
must make discriminations and distinctions all the
time, such as in routine matters related to job hiring,
the granting of licences, the making of any legislative
category that touches on age or disability or, in
appropriate settings, relevant and important decisions
and distinctions based on sex or even religion.
A diverse and open society is one that can manage
the many forms of accommodation necessary to ensure
appropriate freedoms and their exercise. Restrictive
societies, on the other hand, fail to provide for such
accommodation. Grand-sounding language using the
rhetoric of ‘non-discrimination’ or ‘equality’, both vague
terms, may often be used to reduce the very things they
claim to expand. Thus, George Orwell’s use of the term
‘equality’ in his justly famous short novel Animal Farm,
in which ‘all animals are equal and some are more equal
than others’, alerts or ought to alert us to the risks of this
sort of rhetorical take-over of freedom by languages of
pseudo-egalitarianism.22
2. The need to respect diversity and difference in clear
and express language and recognise that they are
prior to equality; the creation of a legal presumption
in favour of diversity
Terms such as ‘equality’ must be understood as following
upon context, not as somehow prior to context. Just as

there should be a presumption in favour of diversity in any
proposed law, there should also be express recognition of
differences in relation to beliefs of religion and conscience
and, therefore, ample protection where conscience is
under threat from ‘one size fits all’ application. This means
that, in areas such as controversies in the medical field
(euthanasia and abortion) or related to aspects of culture
(such as the nature of marriage or gender roles within
religions), safeguards need to be provided for in relation
to exemptions and allowances for difference. It can be
anticipated, as has been seen in other jurisdictions, that
human rights will become little more than a tool used to
beat diversity into submission, if our legal mechanisms do
not set out that diversity as the recognised prior condition:
deep diversity is the goal here.
In other words diversity, respected as difference, is the
setting within which equality is understood, not the other
way around. It should be remembered that, in fact, in all
constitutions and human rights frameworks, ‘religion’ is an
‘equality right’, so the placing of these in opposition, as if
they are in conflict, misunderstands the correct relationship between them. Again, it should be the associational
context that provides the framework within which equality is assessed, not some abstract conception of ‘equality’
dropped like a mist on culture, including associations.
Mere difference of opinion may, for example, be
stigmatised in clever rhetoric to avoid the nuanced moral
distinctions that some believe to be important and that
define the different moral approaches of different beliefcommunities. Thus, in relation to the morality of sexual acts,
it is a frequent thing to hear one side of the debate - that
with the longest moral tradition and greatest number of
associations gathered around these conceptions – typecast
as ‘homophobic’ by those who have a different view. Yet the
term ‘homophobia’, when unpacked, discloses a failure to
respect any allowable position from which to disagree with
the morality of homosexual acts. Similarly, poor philosophy
conflates desire with the right to exercise a desire in relation to ‘sexual orientation’, yet allows such exercise only
in relation to some desires (not polygamy or polyamory
or pedophilia, for example) - so moral distinctions are still
present but, due to the nature of the debates, largely incoherent. These are worrying realities about which legislators
should be aware in such difficult and contested areas.
Freedom depends upon lived diversity and laws
that protect that diversity in significant ways, not in the
erection of frameworks that claim to respect diversity in
theory but fail to do so in practice. The Canadian dilemma
is the gradual domination of pseudo-diversity in court
and human rights decisions. This lack of respect is also,
unfortunately, visible in Australia, as the section below
on the lack of proper conscience protection in health care
demonstrates.
3. The need to respect the overall ethos or organic
nature in employer exemption cases rather than the
less respectful ‘Core Functions’ approach
It has been recognised that a ‘job-parsing’ or ‘integral
role’ test narrows religious liberty unduly, and fails to
respect the differences between the kinds of religious
organisations that exist. In many, the religious ‘mission’
and ‘ethos’ is not limited to only a few ‘leaders’ but is an
integral part of the whole organisation and its function.
Therefore, to focus only on ‘key roles’ misses this
proper respect for religious diversity. A better approach,
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recommended by Canadian scholar Alvin Esau and the
author of this article, is the ‘organic’ or ‘shared ethos’
approach set out in the latter's PhD thesis.23
In this approach, the question that should be asked of
religious organisations is: ‘what kind of an organisation
is it?’ If the religious ethos is shared by everyone
through manifestation, teaching and practice (such as
teaching, prayer, sacred-text study, retreats etc.), then it is
inappropriate to limit religious employment exemptions
to only ‘key positions’, since everyone in the organisations
is practicing religion ‘organically’. This being the case,
limiting the tests, as many tribunals have done, to ‘key
personnel’ is a significant reduction in the respect for
religious liberty and the respect that should be shown to
religious organisations that function in this ‘organic’ way.
4. The ‘duty of accommodation’ in health care is
badly handled in Australia: the need for conscience
protection and laws that explicitly ensure that there
is no ‘duty of referral’ and that the proper placement
of the onus for the ‘service’ is on the state
Respect for diversity in a medical context requires
careful handling of difference and dissent, and it
requires attention, often missing, to where the onus
lies for obtaining ‘access to services’. Too frequently, it
is just assumed that the primary medical or health care
specialist bears that onus where other means could be
implemented with a bit of ingenuity.
In relation to medical ethics, the practices of both
abortion and euthanasia (the former now legal in some
countries or, as in Australia, officially illegal but with
very wide exceptions) can fail to respect the capacity
of citizens to dissent. It is all too common to see, as one
does in Australia, a failure to recognise that requiring
referrals for abortion (as it would be for euthanasia) is
to treat the autonomous moral views of the health care
worker as irrelevant – it is to accord no respect for the
dignity of the dissenting professional and to load all the
‘autonomy value’ on to the patient, yet this cannot be
correct when two autonomies are in conflict. This error
is all too common and ought to provide serious concern
about how moral issues are weighed at the moment in
Australia.24 The current failure to respect diversity in
relation to accommodation in medicine may be seen
as reflecting an attitude of ‘non-accommodation’, and
this observation might well extend to other areas. Such
errors can only be countered or protected against by
clear language spelling out the need to provide respect
for dissent and the duty of accommodation in all areas of
public and private employment.
5. Another language aspect: offensive speech and the
need to define this tightly so that ‘Hurt Feelings’ do
not become equated with ‘Hatred’

6.4 Every person has the right to religious dignity, which
includes not to be victimised, ridiculed or slandered
on the ground of their faith, religion, convictions or
religious activities. No person may advocate hatred that
is based on religion, and that constitutes incitement to
violence or to cause physical harm. (emphasis added)
The developed and developing view, therefore, based
on the Canadian Federal approach and that recommended
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Some human rights approaches wish to protect people
from being exposed to offensive speech. For example,
the Canadian decision overturning certain language in
a Provincial Human Rights Statute nevertheless failed
to completely overturn its vague and chilling language.
Here, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decision
overturned a trial decision which had upheld the ruling of
a Human Rights Tribunal. The Supreme Court of Canada
chose to disregard the arguments of many groups and
academics and left in place a very heavily criticised
approach to ‘hate speech’.25

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld but narrowed the
legislation by striking out the words ‘ridicules, belittles or
otherwise affronts the dignity of’. The court ruled that this
language was unconstitutional, creating too low a threshold and thus not aligned with the purposes of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Act. The result is that ’hatred’ in
Canada is defined as ‘extreme manifestations of the words
“detestation” and “vilification”, a threshold that would
not include merely repugnant or offensive expression’.
Moreover, tribunals were directed to consider ’the effects
of the expression not its inherent offensiveness’.26 This was
not the approach that free speech and religious groups
called for, namely, to confine the definition of ‘hate speech’
to ‘that which incites violence’, as it continues to suppress
speech that falls short of incitement.
The Respondent on the appeal was a man who
manifested his religious faith by placing certain leaflets
in places such as apartment buildings, pointing out that
in local gay newspapers older men were soliciting young
men for sex. His pamphlets were deemed offensive
but the debate was whether they constituted ‘hatred’.
Despite striking down a portion of the legislation, the
Supreme Court of Canada found against the man for
calling some gays ‘sodomites’ and saying that some of
them were ‘out to get your children’, thus upholding
the law that many thought overboard and leaving in
place the fine against him. Many thought that these
expressions, while clearly not polite, ought not to have
been construed as ‘hatred’. Whatcott had argued that he
was trying to protect young men from his own fate at the
hands of older men he believed were predatory. There is
widespread dissatisfaction with the result in Canada.
Meanwhile, a Report prepared for the Canadian Federal
Government by academic Richard Moon recommended
repeal of Section 13, the ‘hate speech’ Section of the
Canada Human Rights Act. Professor Moon argued that, if
complete repeal was not to occur, such speech should be
limited to ‘advocating violence’. He further argued that the
more appropriate approach and place for such restrictions
was under the Criminal Code and in the Criminal courts,
not before Tribunals, which he found on his review to have,
inter alia, insufficient safeguards to protect fundamental
rights.27 The Section was repealed in June 2013. Clearly
the area of ‘offensive speech’ is far from settled in Canada.
The current public rhetoric over same-sex marriage in
Australia suggests that such allegations of ‘hatred’ for what
is merely the advocacy of traditional marriage will occur
here, too, unless legal protections are set up in advance.
In addition, the South African Charter of Religious
Rights and Freedoms, a civil society Charter under Section
234 of the South African Constitution, signed by all the
Religions of that country in 2010, also recommends that
the freedom of expression be limited only according to
hatred defined as constituting ‘incitement to violence or
[that causes] physical harm’.28 The full provision reads:

16
by the religions in South Africa, is that the best approach
is to limit ‘hate speech’ to incitement of violence or
physical harm and to subject it to Criminal proceedings,
rather than to administrative Tribunals under vague
categories such as ‘hurt feelings’ or ‘offended dignity’.
When these are allowed, such uses are likely to chill
(i.e. inhibit or discourage) valid free speech or may be
deployed in relation to contemporary notions such as
‘homophobia’, which has been discussed above.

Endnotes
1.

2.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Since human rights expansion fails to respect
diversity, diversity must be recognised expressly as a
good to be maintained, and any developments should
include a presumption in favour of diversity.
2. Since not all ‘discriminations’ can be said to be legally
wrong, create the category of ‘unjust discrimination’ to
distinguish it from ‘discrimination’.
3. Human rights tests in relation to exemptions usually
fail to respect the ethos of organisations as they tend
to have a bias towards individual rather than group
rights - in particular, a specific ‘job-parsing’ approach
to employment exemptions that focuses on so-called
‘core functions’ fails to respect properly the nature
of certain kinds of religious organisations. Therefore,
do not make any employment-related exemptions
dependant upon the functions of the job in the case of
an organisation where there is a shared ethos; instead,
respect the organic approach to religious exemptions
so that all employees in such an organisation, not just
those in ‘leadership’ roles, have their beliefs respected.
4. The duty of accommodation is essential in all areas
of public or private function, and existing practice in
Australia (particularly in relation to medical issues)
shows a marked failure to provide accommodation
and respect for conscience. Therefore, the duty of the
accommodation of conscience should be spelled out
as both a public and private necessity and, in relation
to medical (and pharmaceutical) services, the right to
conscientious objection and non-referral should be
recognised and protected.

3.
4.

5.
6.

7.

8.

5. Since ‘hate speech’ chills expression and there has
been wide criticism of ‘feelings’-based tests for insult
or injury, it is important to limit offensive speech
restrictions to ‘incitement to violence or physical harm’.
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